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I.

INTRODUCTION

On September 11, 2001, the United States found itself in turmoil, suddenly the U.S.
entered a new kind of struggle, a struggle that required swift and severe actions to defeat those
behind the September 11, 2001,1 terrorist attacks. In response this new threat, Congress passed
the Authorization for Use of Military Force. This statute authorized the President to:
[U]se all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the
United States by such nations, organizations or persons.2
As apparent from its text, this Congressional authorization gave the President the authority to use
force against those, and their allies, determined to have planned, authorized, committed, or aided
in the 9/11 attacks. Specifically, in 2001, this authorization was applicable to Al-Qaeda and its
leader, Osama Bin Laden, who planned and carried out the 9/11 attacks; and the Taliban, who
harbored Al-Qaeda. It is obvious that the AUMF’s purpose was to provide the President with

1

See, 9/11 attacks, History.com, A+E Networks (2010), available at
http://www.history.com/topics/9-11-attacks. (On September 11, 2001, 19 militants associated
with al-Qaeda hijacked four airplanes and carried out suicide attacks against United States
(herein after “9/11 attacks or attacks”).
2
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (herein after
“2001 AUMF” or “AUMF”).
2

domestic authorization for use of force against those who “planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the 9/11 attacks or harbored such organizations or persons”.3 However, 17 years after the
attacks and 7 years after Bin Laden’s death, the government has been using the AUMF to justify
the use of force against new terrorist and extremist groups, many of which were not closely
involved in 9/11 and may not have even existed in 2001.4 This new theory was first introduced
by President Obama in 2009. Shortly after he took office, the Obama Administration filed a
memorandum in the Guantanamo Bay Detainee litigation explaining the President’s
interpretation of his statutory authority to detain enemy forces as an facet of his authority to use
force under the 2001 AUMF.5 The memo explained that the statute authorized the detention of
“persons who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaeda forces or associated
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including
any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly supported hostilities, in aid of
such enemy armed forces.”6 Though no court has ruled on the legality of extending the 2001
AUMF to ISIS, the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit have validated the President’s authority to
detain “associated forces” of those responsible for the 9/11 attacks under the 2001 AUMF.
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the President has
the authority to detain citizens who qualify as “enemy combatants,” understood to be any

3

Id.
see Letter from President Trump (Dec. 11, 2017), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/text-letter-President-speaker-houserepresentatives-President-pro-tempore-senate-2/ (affirming use of force against ISIL is
authorized by President’s constitutional and statutory authority, including both the 2001 and
2002 AUMFs).
5
Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority Relative to
detainees held at Guantanamo Bay at 2, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 624 F. Supp.
2d 27 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009) ( (Nos. 05-0763, 05-1646, 05-2378) (hereinafter Memorandum
Regarding the Government's Detention Authority).
6
Id.
4
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individuals who were part of or supported enemy forces in Afghanistan and who engaged the
United States in armed conflict. The plurality wrote that “the AUMF is explicit congressional
authorization for the detention of individuals in the narrow category […] describe[d].”7 Based on
Hamdi, the D.C. Circuit has rejected many habeas petitions based on the ruling that the President
has the authority to detain individuals who were part of or associated with the Taliban or alQaeda.8 For example, In Al-Adahi v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit held that Mohammed Al-Adahi
was “part of” al-Qaeda and lawfully detained under the 2001 AUMF. Al-Adahi, a Yemeni
national, moved to Afghanistan in the summer of 2001. He stayed in Kandahar with his brotherin-law, who was a close associate of Osama bin Laden. Al-Adahi met with bin Laden twice and
then attended al-Qaeda’s Al Farouq training camp. The court concluded that all of the evidence
against Al-Adahi, including his training at Al Farouq, was sufficient to connect him to an enemy
force covered by the AUMF.9 In another case, in Hussain v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit held that
Abdul al Qader Ahmed Hussain, a Yemeni, was “part of” al-Qaeda and the Taliban and lawfully
detained under the 2001 AUMF because he lived with three Taliban guards and who provided
him with a firearm. The district court concluded that his loyalty to enemy forces was based on
fact that Taliban soldiers gave him an AK-47 while he lived among them near the battle lines.10
The Trump Administration has embraced Obama’s theory of associated forces in
detaining ISIS associates.11 If President Trump delivers on his promise to “load up

7

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004).
Charles Stimson & Hugh Danilack, The Case Law Concerning the 2001 Authorization for Use
of Military Force and Its Application to ISIS, April 17, 2017, available at
https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/the-case-law-concerning-the-2001-authorization-usemilitary-force-and-its#_ftnref13
9
Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
10
Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
11
See, e.g., supra note 4.
8
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[Guantanamo] with bad dudes”12, which could very well include ISIS fighters, those detainees
might successfully challenge not only their own detention under the AUMF, but also the Trump
Administration’s entire legal justification for the authority to use force in the fight against ISIS.
Indeed, that is precisely why happened, the Trump Administration has been challenged on its
detention of an alleged ISIS fighter captured in Iraq in September, 2017. In October 2017, The
American Civil Liberties Union filed a habeas corpus petition on behalf of an unnamed
U.S. citizen detained by U.S. military in Iraq as an enemy combatant for allegedly being an ISIS
fighter in Syria. Doe asserts that an American citizen cannot lawfully be detained without due
process absent a clear statutory authorization by Congress for that specific purpose.13 Among
other defenses, the government contends that its actions are authorized by Congress under the
2001 AUMF, which authorizes the use of force, including military detention, against both alQaeda and “associated forces” of al-Qaeda. Hence, as an alleged member of ISIS, Doe is a
member of an associated force of Al-Qaeda.14 Thus, under the governments interpretation, ISIS
is part of al-Qaeda and is rightly covered under the 2001 AUMF.15 Additionally, the Obama
Administration argued that the the President’s authority to fight ISIL is further reinforced by the
2002 AUMF against Iraq.16 That AUMF authorized the use of force to, among other things,
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Associated Press, Trump: Load Guantanamo Bay Up with 'Bad Dudes' YouTube (Feb. 26,
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j7dmMI3CtKI. (Then Presidential candidate Trump
promising to load GTMO with bad dudes, referencing enemy combatant detainees).
13
Pet. For a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Am. Civil Liberties Union Found. v. Mattis (D.D.C. 2017);
Order, Am. Civil Liberties Union Found. v. Mattis, No. 17-cv-2069 (TSC) (D.D.C. 2017).
14
Respondents’ Factual Return, 5-12 Am. Civil Liberties Union Found. v. Mattis, No. 17-cv2069 (TSC) (D.D.C. 2017).
15
see Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority, supra note 5. The
government has maintained that authority under the 2001 AUMF extends to "associated forces,"
as well as those directly involved in planning, authorizing, committing, or aiding the attacks.
16
The Framework Under U.S. Law for Current Military Operations: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Stephen W. Preston, Gen.
Counsel, Dep’t of Def.) (General Counsel of the CIA giving a speech on President Obama’s
5

“defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.”17
Now that President Trump has opened the door to judicial review of his interpretation and
extension of the 2001 AUMF to ISIS, we may soon have an answer as to whether the President’s
military efforts against ISIS under the 2001 AUMF is lawful.
Giving the lack of precedent on this specific issue, it is uncertain as to what the court will decide.
It’s possible that the court will agree with President Obama’s original interpretation.18 It is also
likely that the court will accept the government’s assertion that Congress has authorized and
supported the use of force against ISIS through its repeated funding of the President’s counterISIL military actions.19 As the government has put forth a number of defenses to justify its use
of force against ISIS, it’s likely that the court might decide that the President’s extension far
exceeds his authority under the 2001 AUMF while validating the President’s actions under the
2002 AUMF because of the imminent threat that ISIS poses to our national security. Using force
against ISIS could be interpreted as the President defending the country’s national security
interest, which would fall under the 2002 AUMF. Lastly, in line with the 2001 and 2002 AUMF
argument, there’s also a possibility that the court could side with the President in asserting that
military operations against ISIS is cover under the President’s Article II powers since Congress
had passed the 2002 AUMF authorizing offensive ground operations against those who posed a
threat in Iraq, including ISIS’ ever growing presence in Iraq. Thus, it could be argued that the

legal framework for his evolving military operations under the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs since the
9/11 attacks).
17
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-242, 116 Stat. 1501 (2002) (herein
after “2002 AUMF”).
18
See the report, supra note 5. (the government has maintained that authority under the 2001
AUMF extends to "associated forces," as well as those directly involved in planning, authorizing,
committing, or aiding the attacks).
19
See Doe v. Mattis, supra note 15.
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President can invoke his Article II powers against ISIS without seeking additional authorization
from Congress. However, while the government has many avenues to which it seeks to validate
its use of force against ISIS, this paper will solely focus on the government authority under the
2001 AUMF. This article will argue that ISIS is not an associated force of Al-Qaeda, thus ISIS is
not covered under the 2001 AUMF. This article neither substantively disputes nor advocate
Obama’s associated force theory. This article will simply analyze Obama’s interpretation of the
AUMF and apply government’s definition of associate forces to ISIS to determine whether ISIS
meets the two-prong test under the government’s definition. Accepting the government’s concept
of associated forces, the primary focus of this article is to determine, based on ISIS’ history and
current relationship with Al-Qaeda, whether ISIS meets the government’s two-prong test under
the “associated forces” theory. First, the article will discuss the relationship between ISIS and
Al-Qaeda. Next, the article will examine 2001 AUMF currently in effect, its goals, and how it
was intended to be used. Third, the article will discuss the government’s concept of associated
forces. Lastly, the article will lay out reasons why ISIS did not meet the definition of associated
forces in 2009 when it was first announced by the Obama Administration, and why it still does
not qualify in 2018 under the Trump Administration.
II.

ISIS v. AL-QAEDA

Prior to analyzing whether ISIS is an associate force of Al-Qaeda, we must first
understand the history of both organizations, their ideologies, and current relationship status.
Under this section, the article will first discuss the Al-Qaeda’s history, then it will discuss the
history of ISIS, and subsequently discuss their ideologies. Lastly, the article will analyze the
current dispute between the two groups and the current state as it stands today.
a. History of Al-Qaeda

7

Al-Qaeda emerged out of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s.20 As the
Soviets prepared to withdraw, Osama Bin Laden and his associates decided to capitalize on the
network they had built to take jihad global.21 Using contacts and resources from the anti-Soviet
struggle to turn the organization’s focus toward new perceived enemies of Islam beyond
Afghanistan’s borders.22 Bin Laden wanted to create a team of elite fighters to lead the global
jihad movement and bring together the hundreds of small jihadist groups under a single
umbrella.23 In the early 1990s, as the group gained greater notoriety and due to pressure by
various governments and authorities, it changed its base of operations from Afghanistan to Saudi
Arabia in 1990, to Sudan in 1991, and finally back to Afghanistan in 1996.24 After his return to
Afghanistan, Bin Laden received the support from the Taliban regime, and established a base in
their territories.25 At that point, Bin Laden wanted to reorient the movement as a whole,
focusing it on what he saw as the bigger enemy undermining his efforts to unite the jihad world:
The United States. Al-Qaeda allied with and supported terrorist groups throughout the world,
recruited local jihadists, trained them, and sent its own members to help other groups in their
struggles in other parts of the world.
The 1998 attacks on two U.S. embassies in Africa, and of course 9/11, made Al-Qaeda’s brand a
household name. The attacks demonstrated the power, capabilities, reach, and sheer audacity of
the organization. Although the 9/11 attacks electrified the global jihadist movement and raised

20

Daniel Byman and Jennifer Williams, ISIS v. Al-Qaeda, Jihadism global civil war, Brookings,
(February 24, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/isis-vs-al-Qaeda-jihadisms-global-civilwar/. (explain the history and rivalry between ISIS and Al-Qaeda).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
8

Al-Qaeda’s profile on the global stage, the U.S. counterterrorism response that followed was
devastating to both Al-Qaeda and the broader movement it purported to lead. Over the next
decade, the U.S. relentlessly pursued Al-Qaeda, targeting its leadership, disrupting its finances,
destroying its training camps, infiltrating its communications networks, and ultimately crippling
its ability to function. It remained a symbol of the global jihadist movement, but its inability to
successfully launch another major attack against the United States meant that symbol was
becoming less powerful.26 While al-Qaeda’s influence has decreased over the years since the
9/11 attacks, it’s presence and influence remain strong around the world Muslim world. In mere
days after the attacks, an unprecedented onslaught from the U.S. followed. One-third of alQaida’s leadership was killed or captured in the following year.27 The group lost its safe haven
in Afghanistan, including its extensive training infrastructure there. However, al-Qaeda had not
been defeated as it’s leader Bin Laden was still at large. With help from allies, al-Qaeda was able
to survive the immediate aftermath of 9/11. The Afghan Taliban stood by al-Qaeda after the
attack, refusing to surrender Bin Laden and thereby precipitating the U.S. invasion of
Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda’s first and most notorious affiliate alliance was al-Qaida in Iraq
(AQI), who protected them in 2004 during the U.S. invasion in Iraq. AQI was founded by an
associate of Bin Laden, a Jordanian jihadist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.28 This very group is now
known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,29 leading many to believe that ISIS is a product of
al-Qaeda.

26

Id.
Tricia Bacon, Why al-Qaida is still strong 16 years after 9/11, The Conversation (Sept. 10,
2017), https://theconversation.com/why-al-qaida-is-still-strong-16-years-after-9-11-83403.
28
Supra note 21.
29
More commonly known as ISIS or ISIL
27
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b. History of ISIS
ISIS’ roots can be traced back to 2004, founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi under the
name al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Al-Zarqawi was originally part of bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network,
whom he met during the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. Prior to pledging allegiance to AlQaeda in 2004 and changing its name, the group was originally called Jam’at al-Tawhid wa’al
Jihad. However, even from the early days of its partnership, the groups disagreed on targeted
enemies. Bin Laden focused on the U.S. as its main target and Al-Zarqawi emphasized sectarian
war and attacks on Sunni Muslims deemed as apostates, such as those who collaborated with the
Shi’a-led regime.30 AQI bombed Shia mosques and slaughtered Shia civilians, hoping to provoke
mass Shia reprisals against Sunni civilians and force the Sunnis to rally behind them. al-Zarqawi
died in the 2006 U.S. airstrikes, after which Egyptian, Abu Ayyub al-Masri took over and
announced the creation of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). al-Masri was later killed in 2010 and his
predecessor, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, took over in 2011. al-Baghdadi asserted unilateral control
over all al-Qaeda operations in Iraq and Syria, changing the group’s official name to the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).31 This mass expansion angered al-Qaeda leader, Ayman alZawahiri, leading to the split between Isis and al-Qaeda.32 In February 2014, Zawahiri publicly
disavowed Baghdadi’s group, formally ending their affiliation.33 This split divided the jihadist
movement, leading many to believe that ISIS is the the true inheritor of Osama bin Laden’s

30

Id.
Id.
32
Zach Beauchamp, ISIS, a history: how the world's worst terror group came to be, Vox,
(November 19, 2015), https://www.vox.com/2015/11/19/9760284/isis-history (explaining the
ultimate decision that led to ISIS and al-Qaeda’s split, dividing the jihadist movement in Syria).
33
Id.
31
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legacy.34 At one point in time, the two groups seemed indistinguishable. The groups, who’s
leaders once fought side by side and protected each other in times of need, no longer share that
bond. At the present time, while al-Qaeda remains true to Bin Laden’s legacy to spread Islam
throughout the Middle East by overthrowing corrupt “apostate” regimes in the Middle East and
replacing them with “true” Islamic governments, and weakening western influence in the Middle
East, ISIS is much more concerned with expanding its territory and purifying the Muslim world,
even if it means killing fellow Muslims. While they share a common goal, their approach to
accomplishing that goal are vastly different.35 The next section explores those differences.
c. Different Ideologies
The dispute between ISIS and Al-Qaeda is more than just a fight for power within the
Jihadist movement. The two organizations differ on enemies, strategies, tactics, and other
fundamental concerns.36 Although the ultimate goal of Al-Qaeda is to overthrow the corrupt
“apostate” regimes in the Middle East and replace them with “true” Islamic governments, AlQaeda’s primary enemy is the United States, which it sees as the root of its problems in the
Middle East. By targeting the United States, Al-Qaeda believes it will eventually induce the U.S.
to end support for these Muslim state regimes and withdraw from the region altogether, thus
leaving the regimes vulnerable to attack from within. Al-Qaeda considers Shia Muslims to be

34

https://millercenter.org/president/obama/foreign-affairs (The White House argued that the
resolution covered a war on ISIS because the terrorist organization is “the true inheritor of
Osama bin Laden’s legacy—notwithstanding the recent public split between al Qaeda’s senior
leadership and ISIS).
35 Daniel Byman, Comparing Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different goals, different targets, Brookings,
(April 29, 2015), available at https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/comparing-al-qaeda-andisis-different-goals-different-targets/. (explaining the history and rivalry between ISIS and AlQaeda).
36

From early in the partnership the group differences were apparent which led ISIS being
reluctant to join al-Qaeda.
11

apostates but sees their killing to be too extreme, a waste of resources, and detrimental to the
broader jihadist project.37
The Islamic State, on the other hand, does not follow Al-Qaeda’s “far enemy” strategy,
preferring instead the “near enemy” strategy, albeit on a regional level. As such, the primary
target of the Islamic State has not been the United States, although ISIS has taken credit for
many attacks in the U.S. and in Europe,38 but rather “apostate” regimes in the Arab world—
namely, the Assad regime in Syria and the Abadi regime in Iraq. Like his predecessors, Baghdadi
favors purifying the Islamic community first by attacking Shi’a and other religious minorities as
well as rival jihadist groups. ISIS emphasizes that “all Muslims must associate exclusively with
fellow true Muslims and dissociate from anyone not fitting this narrow definition; failure to rule
in accordance with God's law constitutes unbelief; all Shia Muslims are apostates.39 ISIS also
differs from al-Qaeda in that it promotes offensive and defensive jihad.40 To the contrary, alQaeda focuses on defensive jihad, promoting only what it classifies as defensive military
acts.41 Offensive jihad focuses on the “the uprooting of shirk, idolatry, wherever it is found.42
Lastly, The Islamic State’s strategy is to control territory, steadily consolidating and expanding
its position. Part of it is ideological: it wants to create a government where Muslims can live
under Islamic law. Part of this also is inspirational: by creating an Islamic state, it electrifies

37

Id.
Brooke Sigman, Timeline of Recent Terror Attacks Against the West, FoxNews Channel (Nov.
1, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/11/01/timeline-recent-terror-attacks-againstwest.html.
39
Samantha Arrington Sliney, Right to Act: United States Legal Basis Under the Law of Armed
Conflict to Pursue the Islamic State in Syria, 6 U. Miami Nat'l Sec. & Armed Conflict L. Rev. 1,
7–8 (2016) at 11.
40
Id at 10.
41
Id.
42
Id.
38
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many Muslims who then embrace the group. And part of it is basic strategy: by controlling
territory it can build an army, and by using its army it can control more territory. Indeed, ISIS’
connection to al-Qaeda cannot be ignored. From its inception when Bin Laden funded some of
its startup operations, to AQI sheltering Bin Laden from U.S. forces in 2004, al-Qaeda’s imprint
is embedded in ISIS’ history. However, many things have changed since AQI first emerged in
2004. The most important change being ISIS’ relationship with al-Qaeda. The relationship, as it
was known to the world in 2004, is no longer. The groups no longer share a common goal or
ideology. All association between the two groups have been denounced, taking ISIS out of the
ambit of the AUMF. Having determined that the association between ISIS and al-Qaeda is no
longer, the next section of the article will analyze the 2001 AUMF and Obama’s interpretation
and extension of the AUMF to ISIS.
III.

THE 2001 AUMF

The AUMF was introduced and passed both the House and Senate on September 14, 2001.43
The AUMF was signed into law on September 18, 2001, by President George W. Bush. The text
of the AUMF gives the President authority to use force against those that the President
determines are responsible for the 9/11 attacks.44 In a mere 60-word paragraph, the AUMF
provides the President with authorization to use all necessary and appropriate force against
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
9/11 attacks, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.45

43

see AUMF, supra note 2.
Id.
45
See Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2(a).
44
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Nowhere in the statute does Congress explicitly mentioned the concept of associated
forces. Any target under the AUMF must be linked to responsibility for the 9/11 attacks.46 The
AUMF was clearly directed at the perpetrators of 9/11 and their allies. President Bush initially
demanded broader authority under the AUMF, but Congress rejected his request for such broad
authorization.47 Initially, the Bush Administration sought authority to “deter and pre-empt any
future attacks of terrorism or aggression against the United States.”48 President Bush’s initial
draft of the AUMF did not contain the 9/11 nexus, requiring those targeted under the AUMF to
be responsible for the 9/11 attacks. This authorization would have allowed the President to use
preventative force against terrorism anywhere in the world, regardless of whether there was a
nexus between the target and the 9/11 attacks.49 This draft would have allowed the U.S. to target
ISIS at any point in its development if the President determined that the use of force was
necessary to deter and prevent a future attack against the United States.50 Congress rejected the
Bush Administration’s version for the current wording of the AUMF, leaving the requirement of
a nexus to the 9/11 attacks in place.51
The 9/11 clause in the AUMF gives the President discretion to determine the method of
attack, the target of the attack, and the location of the attack if the target can be linked back to the

46

LoGaglio, Gabrielle. "Crisis With ISIS: Using ISIS's Development to Analyze "Associated
Forces" Under the AUMF." National Security Law Brief 5, no. 1 (2014): 127-171, at 132.
47
see generally Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 harv. l. rev. 2047 (2005) (explaining that the AUMF has no jurisdictional limit,
allowing the President to target an individual with a nexus to executing the 9/11 attacks
anywhere in the world).
48
Jennifer Daskal & Steve Vladeck, After the AUMF: a Response to Cheney, Goldsmith,
Waxman and Wittes, lawFare (Mar. 17, 2013), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/after-theaumf/ (quoting the Bush Administration’s proposed language for the AUMF).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. supra note 49.
14

9/11 attacks.52 While the AUMF describes the nexus for potential targets, it does not specify an
actual target, such as al-Qaeda or the Taliban, or a specific geographic location. It authorizes the
President to use force against any “nation, organization, or persons” that the President
determines “planned, authorized, committed or aided” in the 9/11 attacks.53 It also places no
explicit limits on the methods of attack that the President may use to target those responsible for
the 9/11 attacks.54 It simply dictates that the President may use all “necessary and appropriate
force.”55 In accord with his broad concept, the Supreme Court has interpreted this language to
include detention of enemy combatants, specifically stating that the AUMF authorizes the
President to detain those suspected of aiding in the 9/11 attacks.56 As explained the introductory
section, the Supreme Court in Hamdi upheld the detention of those considered to be part of or
substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces, affirming the detention of
individuals linked to 9/11 as enemy combatants.57 Lastly, the AUMF contains no end date or
sunset clause, allowing it to exist until Congress takes action to repeal the bill. Even now that the
threat from al-Qaeda (and those individuals responsible for the 9/11 attacks) has subsided, the
AUMF remains in force until Congress takes action to repeal or amend it.58 Although there have
been proposals to repeal the AUMF or set a sunset date, none of those efforts have succeeded.59

52

See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 29, at 2050-51.
See Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2(a).
54
See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 29, at 2078-79.
55
See supra note 2.
56
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (2004).
57
Id.
58
Gregory D. Johnsen, 60 Words and a War Without End: The Untold Story of the Most
Dangerous Sentence in U.S. History, BuzzFeed (Jan. 16, 2014),
http://www.buzzfeed.com/gregorydjohnsen/60-words-and-a-war-without- story-of-the-most.
59
Karen DeYoung, Obama’s Revamp of anti-terror policies stalls, wash. Post, May 21, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/2014/05/21/79ac0f20-e053-11e3-8dccd6b7fede081a_story.html (criticizing the Obama Administration for not taking steps to repeal the
AUMF).
53
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Given that the original bill is still in effect, the next section will analyze interpretation and
extension of the bill.
a. Obama’s Extension of The 2001 AUMF
The theory of associated forces was first introduced by the Obama Administration in
2009 in its Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority60 to expand the reach
of the AUMF without going back to Congress for approval to use military force against new
terror groups.61 This memo maintains that authority under the 2001 AUMF extends to
“associated forces,” as well as those directly involved in planning, authorizing, committing, or
aiding the attacks.62 In December 2016, President Obama released the White House Report on
the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States’ Use of Military Force and Related
National Security Operations identifying two domestic legal bases for the use of military force:
the 2001 AUMF and the President’s “Commander in Chief” constitutional powers.63 For
purposes of this article, we will focus solely on the President’s AUMF argument. According to
the report, “all three branches of the U.S. Government have affirmed the ongoing authority
conferred by the 2001 AUMF and its application to al-Qaeda, to the Taliban, and to forces
associated with those two organizations within and outside Afghanistan.”64 Indeed, while the
Supreme Court and Congress, through their respective actions, have validated this interpretation
with regard to those who are part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda or the Taliban, they’ve
not extended the 2001 AUMF to cover ISIS. As cited in the report, Congress passed the 2012

60

See Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority, supra note 5.
Report on The Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States’ Use of Military Force
and Related National Security Operations, p. 4, https://fas.org/man/eprint/frameworks.pdf.
62
See, e.g. Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority, supra note 5.
63
See the report, supra note 62.
64
Id at 4.
61
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National Defense Authorization Act to provide funding for military operations and while also
expanding the President’s authority under the 2001 AUMF.The NDAA codifies the expensive
interpretation of the detention authority under the 2001 AUMF advanced by the Obama
Administration. It provides pursuant to the 2001 AUMF, the president has the authority to
detained “covered persons”, including those who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
9/11terrorist attacks, or harbored those responsible for those attacks and those who were “a part
of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.”65 Similarly, In Hamdi the Court
affirmed the President’s power to indefinitely detain members of al Qaeda and the Taliban,
holding that detentions of citizen-detainees are part of the exercise of “necessary and appropriate
force” authorized by the AUMF.66
The report then defined and outlined conditions that must be met for an entity to be
considered an “associated force” for the purposes of the 2001 AUMF. According to the
government’s definition, to be considered an “associate force” of al-Qaeda under the 2001
AUMF, an entity must satisfy two conditions: 1) the entity must be an organized, armed group
that has entered the fight alongside al-Qaeda; and 2) the group must be a co-belligerent with alQaeda in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.67 Thus, as explained in the
report, a group is not an associate force merely because it aligns with al-Qaeda or embraces their
ideology. Rather, it must have entered al-Qaeda’s fight against the U.S. or a U.S. ally.68
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To further elaborate on this concept, the report provided two examples of how these
principles have been applied. First, Al-Shabaab, operating in Somalia, is an associated force of
al-Qaeda because it (1) publicly pledged loyalty to al-Qaeda, (2) made clear that the United
States is an enemy, and (3) is responsible for attacks and threats against US interests and persons.
Likewise, the report laid out specific examples as to why ISIS also meets this definition. The
government asserts that ISIS meets its definition of associated forces because the group now
called ISIS, although not in existence in 2001, was founded by an associate of Osama bin Laden
in 2003 and conducted a series of terrorist attacks in Iraq beginning that same year. A year after
its foundation, the group publicly pledged allegiance to bin Laden, with Bin Laden declaring
them the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2004, 3 years after the 9/11 attacks and nearly a year after
it had been operating on its own without Bin Laden’s assistance. Therefore, notwithstanding
ISIS’s feud and publicly disassociation from al-Qaeda in 2014, the government maintains that
ISIS is still an associate force of al-Qaeda because it “continues to wage hostilities against the
United States as it has since 2004, when it joined bin Laden’s al-Qaeda.69 Accepting the
government’s definition as true, the next section will analyze whether ISIS meets the
government’s two-prong test.
IV.

IS ISIS AN ASSOCIATED FORCE OF AL-QAEDA?

With a better understanding of the history between ISIS and al-Qaeda, the history and
goals behind the 2001 AUMF, and the government’s interpretation and expansion of the 2001
AUMF, this section will analyze whether ISIS satisfies the two-prong standard developed by the
Obama Administration. A deeper analysis of the Obama two-prong test reveals the repetitive
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nature of the “associated forces” theory. In analyzing and applying each standard to ISIS, it
becomes readily apparent the two-prongs are one and the same. As articulated by December 5th
report, an associated force of al-Qaeda must be 1) an organized, armed group that has entered the
fight alongside al-Qaeda, and (2) a co-belligerent with al-Qaeda in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners.70 However, under the concept of co-belligerency as established
under the law of war, when a group has joined in the fight with al-Qaeda, they have also
essentially become a co-belligerent of al-Qaeda. Co-belligerency is defined as “fully fledged
belligerent fighting in association with one or more belligerent powers.”71 Accordingly, stating
that a group has “entered the fight alongside al-Qaeda” is essentially stating that a group is “cobelligerent of al-Qaeda”. As such, this subsection will focus primarily on whether ISIS is an
organized and armed group as required under the first prong. Since “entering the fight along
alongside al-Qaeda” and being a “co-belligerent with al-Qaeda” are essentially the same, those
two elements will be analyzed simultaneously in the subsequent subsection. Again, the article
does not seek to substantively dispute or advocate Obama’s associated force theory. The article
will determine if ISIS satisfies the government’s definition of associated forces under its
proffered two-prong test. Though the article does not analyze the substantive components of the
Obama Test, it will nonetheless provide a modified version of the two-prong test, as well a
suggestion for a new AUMF, better suited to encompass ISIS in the conclusion section of the
article.
b. First Prong
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In its current state, ISIS certainly fits the definition of an organized and armed group.
Though that has not always been the case, as ISIS has had its fair share of ups and downs. From
when it was first known as AQI, its structure and actions made them an organized and armed
group. After pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda, AQI gained popularity, increasingly used brutal
tactics and attacked Shia religious sites.72 AQI organized criminal activities, orchestrated attacks,
and released statement to disseminate its message. AQI established and orchestrated the use
suicide bombings and roadside bombings, a tactic that al-Qaeda widely accepted.73 by the end of
2004, AQI was estimated to have 15,000 active members.74 Zarqawi, AQI’s leader, was also
skilled in his use of the internet and media to disseminate al-Qaeda’s message.75 Zarqawi began
using chat rooms, video clips and gruesome videos to convey his message.76 After the death of
Zarqawi in 2006, AQI’s reign and power began to crumble as it transitioned to new leadership.77
It took on a new name as Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and attempted to rebrand itself.78 However,
its efforts were unsuccessful. By 2008, ISI was on the verge of collapse.79 ISI was no longer able
to launch attacks with the same frequency or to hold territory.80 It’s organized structure had
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become so weak that CIA director Michael Hayden declared that ISI was no longer a threat to
the United States.81 ISI’s leadership structure crumbled, leading ISI’s members to dissolve into
other Sunni insurgencies. By 2012, under new leadership and less ties to al-Qaeda, came the
birth of ISIS. The group had regained its strength and was active again.82 ISIS had become a
force to be reckoned with. ISIS coordinated attacks on Shia markets, cafes, and mosques. 20122013, marked the beginning of one of ISIS’s bloodiest periods. They coordinated attacks across
several cities in Iraq that targeted Shias and killed civilians.83 For twelve days straight in 2012,
ISIS launched coordinated attacks that each killed at least 25 Iraqis per attack.84 ISIS’s
resurgence between 2012-2013 led US officials to reevaluate the threat level of ISIS. Matt Olson,
the head of the National Counterterrorism Center stated that ISIS, at this point, was stronger than
any previous point in its history.85 After ISIS’s resurgence in Iraq, the United States offered ten
million dollars for information that would help authorities to capture or kill Baghdadi.86 ISIS
managed to rebuild its organizational structure and successfully launched large-scale attacks.
ISIS’s structure allowed the group to hold territory and to expand into Syria, demonstrating a
strong organizational structure that allowed ISIS to plan and execute sophisticated attacks inside
Iraq. Dating back to 2012 ISIS was certainly, and still remains, an organized and armed group.
Thus, meeting the first part of the first prong analysis. However, it is less uncertain whether ISIS
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satisfies the second part of this prong, requiring it to have entered the fight alongside al-Qaeda.
As detailed in the next section, dating back to 2014, ISIS neither entered the fight against the
U.S. alongside al-Qaeda nor was it an associated force of or co-belligerent with al-Qaeda.
Therefore, ISIS does not meet the first prong under Obama’s two-prong associated forces test.
c. The Second Prong
For the second prong, the associate force must be “a co-belligerent with al-Qaeda in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners”.87 As the AUMF does not explicitly
mention the “associated forces” language, the Obama Administration has drawn an analogy to
the concept of co-belligerency under the law of war to support its theory.88 According to this
analogy, the United States can use force against associated forces of al-Qaeda because those
forces essentially amount to co-belligerents of al-Qaeda.89 However, under the concept of cobelligerency as established under the law of war, when a group has joined in the fight with alQaeda, they have also essentially become a co-belligerent with al-Qaeda. As defined by author
and law professor, Morris Green, a co-belligerency is a “fully fledged belligerent fighting in
association with one or more belligerent powers.”90 thus, stating that a group has “entered the
fight alongside al-Qaeda” is essentially stating that a group is a “co-belligerent of al-Qaeda”.
Accordingly, if a group does not meet the first prong, it will likely not meet the second prong
under Obama’s two-prong test. Nevertheless, it still remains uncertain whether the law of war
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can be expanded to the United States’ non-international armed conflict with al-Qaeda or the
Taliban.91
i.

The Concept of Co-Belligerency

To fully understand the debate surrounding the United States’ use of co-belligerency
principles, this subsection will first discuss how co-belligerency functions under the law of war.
With that understanding, this subsection then will analyze how the United States has
incorporated those ideas into defining the associated forces of al-Qaeda and it will provide
reasons why the U.S.’s application of co-belligerency to ISIS is improper. Under international
law, there are two general types of armed conflicts, international armed conflicts (IACs) and
non-international armed conflicts (NIACs).92 The International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) has defined IACs as conflicts with two or more opposing states and NIACs as armed
conflicts between governmental forces and non-governmental armed groups or between only
non-governmental armed groups.93 The law of war, including the Geneva Conventions, governs
IACs.94 However, NIACs are not as well defined and therefore are not as strictly governed under
international law.95 Co-belligerency, however, is well-defined and incorporated into the law of

91

E.g. Ben Emmerson, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, human rights counsel (Feb.
28, 2014) (explaining that the United States has improperly extended co-belligerency principles
to its con ict with al-Qaeda); see also Christof Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur
on extrajudicial summary or arbitrary executions, united national general assemBly (Sept. 13,
2013) (explaining that the United States cannot use principles of co-belligerency to target
associated forces of al-Qaeda).
92
How is the Term “Armed Con ict” De ned in International Humanitarian Law, International
committee oF the red cross (Mar. 17, 2008), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/ les/other/opinionpaper-armed-con ict.pdf.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 1-2
95
See Rebecca Ingber, Untangling Belligerency from Neutrality in the Con ict with al-Qaeda, 47
tex. int’l l.J. 75, 81 (2011) (explaining that NIACs are more difficult to de ne because the
concept of the “enemy is murky).
23

war governing IACs.96 A co-belligerent is a state that has entered a conflict alongside another
belligerent, itself becoming a belligerent and a party to the conflict.97 A co-belligerent state is a
“fully fledged belligerent fighting in association with one or more belligerent powers.”98
According to the ICRC Commentaries to the Geneva Conventions, co-belligerency can be
demonstrated through a “de facto relationship” that “may find expression merely by tacit
agreement,” if the operations are such as to indicate clearly for which side the belligerent
organization is fighting.99 While an IAC is taking place, a third-party state’s breach of neutrality
(such as providing soft support to the enemy state) is not enough to render the third-party a cobelligerent.100 A third-party must join the belligerent in the fight and must be fighting in
association with the belligerent in order to amount to a co-belligerent. Similarly, under the
Obama standard, a group is not an associated force simply because it aligns with or embraces the
belligerent’s ideology. Therefore, “[d]uring an IAC, a state may use force against a cobelligerent of its enemy without an additional authorization or declaration of war.”101 Hence why
the Obama Administration adopted this concept as a tactic to use force against ISIS without
express congressional authority. Although co-belligerency is well defined in IACs, cobelligerency has not been as readily extended to NIACs.102 Co-belligerency stems from statebased neutrality law.103 Neutrality law addresses the rights and responsibilities of states that are
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not enemies in a conflict. Each state has an obligation to remain neutral while an IAC is taking
place.104 Remaining neutral means that a third-party must not support one party to a conflict over
another.105 Small violations, such as expressing public support for one side absent material
support, are not sufficient to turn a third-party into a co-belligerent.106 However, if a party joins a
belligerent in the conflict, they will be breaking their own neutrality and become a co-belligerent
to the conflict.107
Neutrality law only binds states.108 Individuals or organizations are free to provide
support to a belligerent in a conflict without it violating their host state’s neutrality.109 Given that
neutrality law is an inter-state concept, it has not been determined as to what extent it can be
applied to non-state actors, like ISIS, in a non-international armed conflict.110 Despite these
uncertainties, the Obama Administration has readily implemented principles of co-belligerency
in reading the AUMF to authorize the United States to target and detain associated forces of alQaeda and the Taliban.111 This concept is illustrated in Hamdan, wherein the Supreme Court
held that the United States is engaged in a NIAC with al-Qaeda and the Taliban112. Therefore,
unless the government can proffer evidence to establish that the concept of co-belligerency, as
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defined under international law, applies or has been applied to a non-governmental armed groups
like ISIS, it is clearly out of the confines of the AUMF based on Hamdan.
ii.

Is ISIS a Co-Belligerent Under the 2001 AUMF?

With a better understanding of the co-belligerent concept, this subsection will analyze
whether ISIS fits that definition under the second prong of the Obama two-prong test. Accepting
the Obama definition as true, this subsection will conclude that ISIS does not meet the second
prong even under the Administration’s own definition and application. Dating back to ISIS’s
foundation when it was known as AQI and was initially led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a close
associate of Bin Laden who publicly pledged allegiance, and who was tasked with spreading alQaeda to Iraq, ISIS could almost certainly have been considered a co-belligerent of al-Qaeda.
Additionally, the U.S. could have relied on the 2002 authorization to attack and retaliate against
insurgents inside of Iraq in its efforts to destroy al-Qaeda.113 Even outside of Iraq, the U.S. could
have used the 2001 AUMF to attack or detain AQI forces operating outside of Iraq as, at that
time, they were operating as an associate of al-Qaeda for many reasons: 1) AQI was founded to
be an extension of al-Qaeda and to allow al-Qaeda to directly attack U.S. forces in Iraq; 2)
Zarqawi was taken in by Bin Laden and specifically tasked with developing an al-Qaeda affiliate
that would spread al-Qaeda’s goals to Iraq; 3) Bin Laden gave Zarqawi the funds and resources
to conduct its operations; and 4) Zarqawi followed Bin Laden’s orders to move the group from
Jordan to Iraq to attack U.S. forces. Zarqawi’s formal acknowledgment of Bin Laden’s
leadership in 2004 demonstrated that AQI recognized that it was working under al-Qaeda in
executing al-Qaeda’s agenda, closely resembling the concept of a co-belligerency.114 All of these
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facts show that AQI was operating under the umbrella of al-Qaeda by working to spread alQaeda’s message in Iraq. Therefore, could have properly been classified as a co-belligerent. At
this particular phase, AQI had indeed “joined the fight alongside al-Qaeda in the fight against the
United States” and fully pledged allegiance to fighting in association with al-Qaeda. However,
fast forward to September 2009, when the government first announced its “associated forces”
theory, ISIS was no longer associated with or fighting alongside al-Qaeda; hence, it was not a cobelligerent and out of the realm of the AUMF. Most notably, 2006 marked the “beginning of the
end” of AQI.115 By that time, the U.S. had killed its fearless leader and was alienated from alQaeda and affiliates due to ideological differences. After it joined forces with al-Qaeda in 2004,
AQI engaged in a number of brutal tactics and high profile attacks on the Shais, which al-Qaeda
did not agree with, causing severe tension between AQI and al-Qaeda.116 After Zarqawi’s death,
both U.S. and Iraqi security experts expected AQI to crumble; however, the group transitioned to
new leadership Abu Ayyub al-Marsi (A.K.A Abu Hamza al Muhajir).117 As AQI continued to
use brutal violence, Sunnis, including al-Qaeda, turned against AQI, forcing AQI to rebrand
itself as tensions grew stronger between AQI and Al-Qaeda.118 In October 2006, In response to
attacks from within the Sunni community, Marsi changed AQI’s name to Islamic State of Iraq
(ISI).119 Changing the group’s name to ISI reflected the group’s new focus on building its
reputation inside Iraq. Nevertheless, ISI was not strong enough to withstand all of its enemies,
both in and outside of Iraq. By 2008, 2,400 members of ISI had been killed and 8,800 had been
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captured.120 In 2007 Zarqawi, who was second-in-command of al-Qaeda at the time, had
announced that there was no longer an al-Qaeda affiliate in Iraq.121 Thus, severing all ties
between ISI and al-Qaeda. From that moment, al-Qaeda no longer recognized ISI as an associate.
Therefore, at this phase, ISI is clearly no longer an associate force when Zawahiri declared that
there is no al-Qaeda affiliate in Iraq. Even if established that ISIS was once an associate of alQaeda, by 2007 that relationship was no longer. Additionally, after the death of its second leader,
Marsi, in 2008, ISI was on the verge of collapse.122 CIA director Michael Hayden declared that
ISI was no longer a threat to the U.S.123 This declaration shows not only had the alliance or cobelligerency between ISI and al-Qaeda ended, it shows that the U.S. was successful in destroying
said association, if it even existed. After 2008 , the United States could not use the AUMF to
target ISI outside of Iraq. This phase marked a turning point when al-Qaeda began distancing its
organization away from ISIS. ISI’s transition out of being an associated force of al-Qaeda
illustrates a flawed area in the test. The Government’s test is flawed because based on the
government’s definition, a group is a co-belligerent with al-Qaeda if the group is involved in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. At this state in its existence, ISI was
clearly not involved in hostilities against the U.S. on al-Qaeda’s behalf.
In 2012, ISI was rebranded under a new leadership and a new name, Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria, ISIS. As ISIS sought to rebuild its organization, it was less focused on renewing its an
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association with al-Qaeda and more focused on expending its territory. The new leader was more
focused on rebuilding ISIS and expanding its territory into Syria than building associations.124 At
this point, ISIS was neither fighting U.S. troops nor attempting to launch attacks against U.S.
forces or its coalitions. Still at this point in time, ISIS could not be considered a co-belligerent
with al-Qaeda in the fight against the U.S. Lastly, in 2013, dispute between ISIS’ leader,
Baghadi, and al-Qaeda’s leader, Zawahiri, led to Baghdidi releasing an audio recording stating,
“I have to choose between the rule of God and the rule of al-Zawahiri and I choose the rule of
god.”, boldly demonstrating Baghdadi’s defiance of al-Qaeda.125 This act of defiance insinuated
that ISIS would not follow al-Qaeda’s agenda or respect their authority; a crucial criterion in
determining whether ISIS is an associated force or a co-belligerent of al-Qaeda. Again, on
February 3, 2014, ISIS tensions with al-Qaeda came to a head and al-Qaeda disavowed ISIS as
an affiliate.126 Zawahiri released a statement explaining that since Baghdadi refused orders from
Zawahiri and al-Qaeda, ISIS was cut off from al-Qaeda, announcing that al-Qaeda has “no
connection” to ISIS and was “not responsible for ISIS’s actions.127 Zawahiri stated that “the
branches of al-Qaeda are the ones that the General Command of al-Qaeda announces and
recognized” and that ISIS was no longer recognized by al-Qaeda. There is no greater act of
dissociation than that. al-Qaeda publicly announced that it has no connection to ISIS, obliterating
any doubt that ISIS meets the Obama Administration’s two-prong “associated force” theory. At
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the time this concept was launched, ISIS was no longer fighting in association with al-Qaeda and
is currently not fighting against the United States or its coalition partners. Under the
government’s own theory, ISIS does not meet its test of associated forces.
On a counter argument, the government has argued that 2001 AUMF covers the use of
force against ISIS because the terrorist organization is “the true inheritor of Osama bin Laden’s
legacy—notwithstanding the recent public split between al Qaeda’s senior leadership and
ISIS.”128 the government asserts that the 2014 split between ISIL and current al-Qaeda leadership
does not remove ISIL from coverage under the 2001 AUMF.129 The government sees ISIS as the
same organization that continues to wage hostilities against the United States since 2004, when it
joined al-Qaeda in its conflict against the United States. In turn, the government appears to be
adopting the “once an associated force, always an associated force” theory. Even if that was the
government’s intension, this reasoning would be flawed. As the former CIA Director, Michael
Hayden, declared in 2008, ISI was no longer a threat to the United States. The war against ISI
was over. The U.S. dismantled the organization that it believed supported or aided al-Qaeda, that
organization no longer exist. The AUMF does not grant the president unlimited power to start
wars with every terrorist group it deems to be a threat to the United States, only against nations,
organizations, or persons the president determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
9/11 attacks, or associates of those organizations. Even under the government’s own definition,
ISIS does not fit this category. Therefore, the AUMF cannot be used as a tool to use military
force against ISIS absent congressional approval.
V.
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In conclusion, the Obama “associated forces” theory is not the proper tool to combat ISIS
under the 2001 AUMF. ISIS cannot be considered an associate force of al-Qaeda because it does
not satisfy the two-prong test. The theory was not sufficient in 2009 when it was first enacted,
and it is still not sufficient in 2018 under the Trump Administration. Unless, the U.S. is prepared
to adopt the “once an associate, always an associate” theory, ISIS does not meet its associated
forces concept. Based on the research and analysis set forth in this article, the only possible time
when ISIS was or should have been considered an associate force of al-Qaeda for purposes of the
AUMF was at the start of its foundation when it’s every move depended on al-Qaeda’s guidance.
The U.S. had its chance and seized it; it eliminated the threat that ISI presented until ISI “was no
longer a threat to the U.S.”130
The ISIS that exists today is not the same ISIS that existed under Bin Laden in 2004. This
ISIS is an independent belligerent with little ties to 9/11. The government should consider
modifying its two-prong test so that it is applicable to ISIS. This can be established by adding a
third prong stating “any organization who at any time after 9/11 supports, protects, provides
shelter, or shields al-Qaeda or the Taliban in an effort to protect them from U.S. military actions
pursuant to the 9/11 attacks, is and will always be considered a co-belligerent in order to prevent
any future terrorist attacks by such organizations or their successors. However, enacting a new
ISIS specific AUMF might prove to be more effective than adding a third prong to the current
test. Under the current conditions, the United States would need a separate Congressional
authorization to attack ISIS either in Syria or Iraq. A new AUMF explicitly naming ISIS would
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certainly be sufficient to accomplish the government’s goal. A new AUMF should state a clear
purpose for which force is being authorized; a clear definition of targeted enemies, with a more
precise definition of “associated forces”; compliance with domestic and international law;
specify the ISIS AUMF provides the sole source of authority to use force against ISIS; and
provide a sunset date.
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